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than 10 percent of its stock. 
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Interests of the Amici Curiae1
 
 
 Amici are diverse health care provider organizations representing 
millions of doctors, nurses and other health care professionals throughout the 
country. Amici believe that the Affordable Care Act is a significant 
achievement for the patients that their members serve because it ensures 
greater protection against losing or being denied health insurance coverage 
and it promotes better access to primary care and to wellness and prevention 
programs. The Act’s goal of optimizing health insurance coverage for the 
greatest number of people permits healthcare professionals to place their 
attention on the most important thing—the patient’s well-being and 
healing—rather than on economic considerations. 
Amici have a significant interest in assisting the Court in 
understanding that the minimum coverage provision challenged by plaintiffs 
is essential to the Affordable Care Act's provisions ensuring that health 
insurance is both universally available and affordable. Because amici’s 
members work on the front lines of the health care system, they know from 
                                                 
1 This brief is filed with the consent of the parties pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 29(a). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 29(c)(5), counsel for amici represent that no counsel for a party 
authored this brief in whole or in part and that none of the parties or their 
counsel, nor any other person or entity other than amici, its members or its 
counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or 
submission of this brief. 
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experience that patients who put off needed care due to lack of insurance 
often end up sicker and require much costlier emergency room care.  
Moreover, amici’s members work throughout the continuum of care and in 
all settings within the health care industry—from direct care to hospital 
administration.  As a result, amici have a uniquely broad perspective on the 
impact of the Affordable Care Act and the capacity to offer information that 
can guide the court’s understanding of the consequences of removing the 
minimum coverage provision to the health provider, patients, and insurance 
markets as a whole. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
Because the district court correctly determined that it lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction over this case, there is no need for this Court to reach the 
merits of appellant’s claims. Should this Court decide to reach the merits, 
however, a decision upholding the challenged provision under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause would provide a limited basis to uphold this provision 
without raising the specter of a national police power. 
Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub 
L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) ("ACA") to achieve near-universal 
health insurance coverage, significantly reduce the economic costs of poor 
outcomes among presently uninsured Americans, prevent cost shifting from 
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uninsured Americans receiving uncompensated care to Americans with 
insurance, and improve the financial security of all families against medical 
costs.  § 10106(a).  Yet, as Congress determined in enacting the ACA, the 
reforms enacted to achieve these goals cannot function effectively without a 
provision requiring all Americans who can afford insurance to either obtain 
it or pay an additional portion of their income with their annual tax return.2
                                                 
2 The ACA labels this provision the "Requirement to Maintain Minimum 
Essential Coverage."  § 1501.  The provision is referred to as the "minimum 
coverage provision" throughout this brief.  
  
§ 1501(a)(2)(G). Although the government correctly argues that the 
minimum coverage provision is a valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce 
and Taxing powers, these arguments are ultimately unnecessary to uphold 
the ACA. The minimum coverage provision is essential to ensuring that the 
ACA’s insurance regulations function effectively—and this fact alone 
compels this Court to uphold the Act under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (holding that courts 
should "refuse to excise individual components" of a larger regulatory 
scheme even when those components could not be enacted on their own 
under the Commerce Clause); id. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“where Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of 
interstate commerce, 'it possesses every power needed to make that 
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regulation effective.’” (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 
U.S. 110, 118 (1942)) (emphasis added)). 
The necessary link between the ACA’s minimum coverage provision 
and its insurance regulations is proven by the experience of every single 
state to require insurers to cover persons with preexisting conditions without 
also enacting a minimum coverage provision. See Brief of Amici Curiae 
American Association of People with Disabilities, et al, at 5–11. Seven 
states enacted preexisting conditions laws without also enacting a minimum 
coverage provision, and all seven states experienced sharp spikes in 
insurance premiums—or worse. Id. Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire and 
Washington each lost most or all of their individual market insurers after 
those states enacted a preexisting conditions provision without enacting a 
minimum coverage provision, and the cost of some New Jersey health plans 
more than tripled after that state enacted a similar law. See infra at 21. 
This necessary link between the ACA’s insurance regulations and the 
minimum coverage provision also distinguishes this provision from 
hypothetical laws compelling the purchase of consumer goods or other 
items. There is no federal law which depends upon mandatory car ownership 
or mandatory vegetable purchases, for example, in order to function properly 
in the same way that the ACA’s preexisting conditions provision can only 
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function properly in the presence of a minimum coverage provision. 
Accordingly, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not provide a 
constitutional basis for such hypothetical laws in the same way that it 
supports the minimum coverage provision. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 38 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he power to enact laws enabling 
effective regulation of interstate commerce can only be exercised in 
conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it 
extends only to those measures necessary to make the interstate regulation 
effective.” (emphasis added)). 
The Necessary and Proper Clause also empowers Congress to ensure 
that federal monies are not spent wastefully.  See Sabri v. United States, 541 
U.S. 600, 605 (2004). Many health conditions and illnesses, if caught early 
and treated with appropriate follow-up care, can be relatively inexpensive to 
resolve. Many conditions can be avoided altogether through preventive care. 
Yet if these conditions or illnesses do not receive prompt and appropriate 
treatment, they can often require hospitalization or otherwise deteriorate into 
a serious condition requiring expensive care. See Institute of Medicine, 
Health Insurance is a Family Matter 106 (2002). Because federal law 
requires virtually all emergency rooms to stabilize patients regardless of 
their ability to pay, see Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 
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U.S.C. § 1395dd., the cost of this expensive care winds up being transferred 
to patients with insurance or to government programs such as Medicare or 
Medicaid.  
Uninsured patients who are near the retirement age are also likely to 
be less healthy than their insured counterparts when they enter the Medicare 
program. As a result, previously uninsured Medicare beneficiaries with 
common conditions such as diabetes or heart disease “reported 13 percent 
more doctor visits, 20 percent more hospitalizations, and 51 percent more 
total medical expenditures” than similarly situated patients who were insured 
prior to qualifying for Medicare. J. Michael McWilliams, Health 
Consequences of Uninsurance Among Adults in the United States: Recent 
Evidence and Implications, 87 Milbank Q. 443, 468 (2009) ("Uninsurance 
Among Adults") 
By encouraging nearly all Americans to join insurance pools, the 
minimum coverage provision empowers patients to seek treatment before 
their conditions become prohibitively expensive to treat and it prevents the 
costs of their treatment from being transferred to taxpayer-funded programs. 
This provides a second reason why the Court should uphold the minimum 
coverage provision. See Sabri, 541 U.S. at 605. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. The Necessary and Proper Clause Empowers Congress to Enact 
Provisions That Are Reasonably Adapted To Making A Broader 
Regulatory Scheme Effective 
 
“[T]he Necessary and Proper Clause makes clear that the 
Constitution’s grants of specific federal legislative authority are 
accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, or useful’ 
or ‘conducive’” to an enumerated power’s “beneficial exercise.”  United 
States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (quoting McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413, 418 (1819)).  Moreover, “Chief 
Justice Marshall emphasized that the word ‘necessary’ does not mean 
‘absolutely necessary.’” Id.  Rather, “[I]n determining whether the 
Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to 
enact a particular federal statute, [courts] look to see whether the statute 
constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a 
constitutionally enumerated power.” Id. at 1956 (emphasis in original).  
The Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to enact 
comprehensive schemes regulating interstate commercial markets—such as 
the national health care or health insurance market—even if individual 
components of that scheme would exceed Congress’ limited powers if 
enacted as standalone provisions. As the Supreme Court explained in 
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Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), a court should not excise “an essential 
part of a larger regulation of economic activity” simply because that part 
could not be enacted alone under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 24 (quoting 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).3
Appellants ask this Court to impose an additional, extra-constitutional 
limit on Congressional power—holding that Congress may not require a 
temporarily inactive health care consumer to take a particular action. Even if 
 This power, however, is 
limited. It “can only be exercised in conjunction with congressional 
regulation of an interstate market, and it extends only to those measures 
necessary to make interstate regulation effective.”  Id. at 38 (Scalia, J, 
concurring in the judgment).   
                                                 
3 The Eleventh Circuit suggested in Florida v. HHS, Nos. 11-11021 & 
11067, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16806 (Aug 12, 2011) that this rule only 
applies to as-applied challenges, and not to claims that a federal law is 
invalid on its face. Id. at *131. This novel suggestion, however, conflicts 
with Supreme Court precedent. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (indicating that a 
law would have been upheld against a facial challenge if it had been an 
"essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity. . . .") Florida also 
conflicts with the decisions of this Court and with previous decisions of the 
Eleventh Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709, 714 (8th 
Cir. 2009) (“Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that 
regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate 
commerce.” (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring))); United 
States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[W]here Congress 
comprehensively regulates economic activity, it may constitutionally 
regulate intrastate activity, whether economic or not, so long as the inability 
to do so would undermine Congress’s ability to implement effectively the 
overlying economic regulatory scheme.”) 
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it were true that individuals subject to the minimum coverage provision are 
not active participants in the health care market—and it is not, see generally 
Brief of Amici Curiae Economic Scholars—appellants’ activity/inactivity 
distinction finds no support in precedent. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 297 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing a legal 
distinction between laws regulating action and those regulating inaction as 
“specious”). As Justice Scalia explains, "where Congress has the authority to 
enact a regulation of interstate commerce, 'it possesses every power needed 
to make that regulation effective.'" Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. at 
118) (emphasis added); see also Comstock, 130 S.Ct at 1968 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (explaining that Congress may exercise its 
necessary and proper power to ensure that another provision of law does 
“not put in motion a particular force . . . that endangers others”). 
The Necessary and Proper Clause also empowers Congress to ensure 
that federal monies are not spent wastefully.  In Sabri v. United States, 541 
U.S. 600 (2004), the Supreme Court upheld a wide-reaching statute 
criminalizing bribery of any state official whose agency or government 
receives federal funds, even though the statute swept broadly to include 
officials who have no contact with the federal funds.  As the Court 
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explained, "Congress has authority under the Spending Clause to appropriate 
federal monies to promote the general welfare, and it has corresponding 
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to see to it that taxpayer 
dollars" are not "frittered away" by bribery-motivated projects that are not 
cost-effective.  Id. at 605 (citations omitted). 
B. The Minimum Coverage Provision is "Reasonably Adapted" To 
Congress' Legitimate Ends Of Regulating Interstate Commerce in 
the Health Market and Ensuring that Federal Health Care 
Spending is Not Wasted 
 
 To accomplish its goals of improving health outcomes, extending 
insurance coverage and promoting financial security against health costs, the 
ACA creates an interconnected network of subsidies and regulations.  Most 
notably, the Act prohibits insurers from denying coverage to consumers with 
preexisting conditions or charging them higher premiums, ACA § 2704, and 
it provides tax subsidies for insurance coverage to individuals with incomes 
between 133% and 400% of the poverty line.  § 1401–02, 2001.  Without the 
minimum coverage provision, these two provisions will be severely 
undermined.  Rather than ensuring equal access to insurance for Americans 
with disabilities or preexisting conditions, the ACA's preexisting conditions 
provision would threaten the nationwide individual insurance market if it 
does not take effect in conjunction with a minimum coverage provision.  
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Likewise, the generous subsidies offered by the ACA will diminish 
drastically in value absent a minimum coverage provision. 
1. Removing The Minimum Coverage Provision Would 
Drive Up The Costs of Care For The Uninsured and 
Shift These Costs To Persons With Insurance 
 
 Many health conditions and illnesses, if caught early and treated with 
appropriate follow-up care, can be relatively inexpensive to resolve.  Many 
conditions can be avoided altogether through preventive care.  Yet if these 
conditions or illnesses do not receive prompt and appropriate treatment, they 
can often require hospitalization or otherwise deteriorate into a serious 
condition requiring expensive care.  See Institute of Medicine, Health 
Insurance is a Family Matter 106 (2002).  Because federal law requires 
virtually all emergency rooms to stabilize patients regardless of their ability 
to pay, see Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
1395dd., the cost of this expensive care winds up being transferred to 
patients with insurance or to government programs such as Medicare or 
Medicaid.  Accordingly the minimum coverage provision is reasonably 
adapted to ensuring that government health care spending is not “frittered 
away” on preventable health care costs.  Sabri, 541 U.S. at 605. 
 The likelihood that a patient will receive adequate preventive care or 
early treatment is directly related to whether the patient is insured.  One 
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study determined that children enrolled in a public health insurance plan 
were 15 percentage points more likely to receive preventive care than those 
who were not.  Institute of Medicine, America’s Uninsured Crisis: 
Consequences for Health and Health Care 61 (February 2009) (“Uninsured 
Crisis”).  Likewise, multiple studies found that uninsured children are "less 
likely to be up-to-date on their immunizations than insured children, 
controlling for observed characteristics of the children." Id.  Use of dental 
services also increases between 16 and 40 percentage points among children 
who are insured.  Id. at 62. 
 The data for adult patients is ever starker: 
[C]hronically ill adults who lacked health insurance had five to 
nine fewer health care visits per year than chronically ill adults 
who have health insurance. Uninsured adults with chronic 
illnesses were much more likely than their insured peers to go 
without any medical visits during the year—even when they 
were diagnosed with serious conditions such as asthma (23.4 of 
uninsured adults with no visits vs. 6.2 percent of insured 
adults), COPD (13.2 vs. 4.0 percent), depression (19.3 vs. 5.2 
percent), diabetes (11.0 vs. 5.2 percent), heart disease (8.7 vs. 
2.9 percent), or hypertension (12.7 vs. 5.3 percent). 
Similarly, uninsured adults with asthma, cancer, COPD, 
diabetes, heart disease, or hypertension are at least twice as 
likely as their insured peers to say that they were unable to 
receive or had to delay receiving a needed prescription[.] 
Id. at 65.  Likewise, routine preventive care such as "mammography, Pap 
testing, cholesterol testing, and influenza vaccination" is far less common 
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among adults who experience frequent periods of uninsurance.  Id.  While 
women who are consistently insured have a 76.7 percent chance of receiving 
mammographies, that chance declines to 34.7 percent for women who 
experience frequent periods of uninsurance.  Id.   Uninsured adults are also 
much less likely to have a continuing relationship with a single provider.  
Among uninsured adults, "19 percent with heart disease, 14 percent with 
hypertension, and 26 percent with arthritis do not have a regular source of 
care, compared with 8, 4, and 7 percent, respectively, of their insured 
counterparts."  Institute of Medicine, Care Without Coverage: Too Little, 
Too Late 29 (2002) ("Care Without Coverage").  This disparity is troubling 
because patients with chronic conditions often must "modify[] their 
behavior, monitor[] their condition and participat[e] in treatment regimens" 
in order to keep their condition under control.  Id. at 57.  Such tasks require 
patients to develop a complex understanding of their condition and to master 
tasks that do not come naturally to persons without education or training in 
the health sciences.  Thus, a patient's continuing relationship with a single 
provider who can answer their questions and monitor their care is "a key to 
high-quality health care" for persons with chronic conditions.  Id.   
 There is robust data demonstrating that uninsured patients' diminished 
access to care causes their medical conditions to deteriorate.  One study 
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found that "near-elderly adults who lost their insurance were subsequently 
82 percent more likely than those who kept their private insurance to report a 
decline in overall health."  Uninsurance Among Adults 469.  The rate of 
asthma-related hospital stays for children with asthma in New York dropped 
from 11.1 percent to 3.4 percent when those children were enrolled in a state 
insurance program.  Peter G. Szilagyi, et al., Improved Asthma Care After 
Enrollment in the State Children's Health Insurance Program in New York, 
117 Pediatrics 486, 491 (2006).  Uninsured children diagnosed with diabetes 
are "more likely to present with severe and life-threatening diabetic 
ketoacidosis" than insured children with the same condition.  Uninsured 
Crisis at 71.  Among stroke patients, "[t]he mortality risk of uninsured 
patients was 24% to 56% higher than that of their privately insured peers for 
acute hemorrhagic and acute ischemic stroke, respectively."  Jay J. Shen and 
Elmer L. Washington, Disparities in Outcomes Among Patients With Stroke 
Associated With Insurance Status, 38 Stroke 1010, 1013 (2007).  Likewise, 
"5-year survival rates for uninsured adults were significantly lower than for 
privately insured adults diagnosed with breast or colorectal cancer—two 
prevalent cancers for which there are not only effective screening tests, but 
also treatments demonstrated to improve survival."  Uninsured Crisis at 78.  
Indeed, a recent Institute of Medicine report documented dozens of 
Appellate Case: 11-1973     Page: 19      Date Filed: 08/19/2011 Entry ID: 3819971
15 
 
empirical studies linking uninsurance with poor health outcomes and 
deteriorated medical conditions.  See generally Uninsured Crisis. 
 When uninsured patients fail to receive preventive care, continuing 
care or early treatment, their healthcare needs and the cost of meeting those 
needs still require them to participate in the health care market.  As a 
condition of their hospital's participation in Medicare, hospital emergency 
departments must stabilize any patent who seeks treatment for an emergency 
medical condition regardless of the patient's ability to pay.  See Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.  Thus, an uninsured 
patient whose condition deteriorates because they are unable to afford less 
expensive preventive or early care will nonetheless receive expensive 
emergency treatment for that condition.  See Care Without Coverage at 58 
(indicating that many uninsured patients "identify an emergency department 
as their regular source of care").  The cost of this uncompensated care is then 
distributed to other patients or to government health programs such as 
Medicare or Medicaid.  According to one study, this cost shifting adds, on 
average, $410 to each individual insurance premium and $1,100 to each 
family premium.  Ben Furnas & Peter Harbage, Ctr. for Am. Progress, The 
Cost-Shift from the Uninsured 2 (March 24, 2009) (“Cost-Shift”).  
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 Uninsured patients' likelihood to delay care and the subsequent 
deterioration of health also drive up Medicare costs.  A twelve-year study of 
patients approaching the age of Medicare eligibility found that previously 
uninsured patients with cardiovascular disease (hypertension, heart disease, 
or stroke) or diabetes often did not receive widely-available and effective 
treatments to prevent costly complications if their conditions developed 
before they qualified for Medicare.  As a result, "previously uninsured 
Medicare beneficiaries with these conditions reported 13 percent more 
doctor visits, 20 percent more hospitalizations, and 51 percent more total 
medical expenditures" than similarly situated patients who were insured 
prior to qualifying for Medicare.  Uninsurance Among Adults at 468. 
 Congress may, through the valid exercise of its spending power, 
require Medicare hospitals to accept uninsured patients into their emergency 
rooms as a condition of participation in the Medicare program.  The ACA's 
minimum coverage provision is reasonably adapted to preventing this 
requirement from driving up the cost of Medicare to taxpayers and 
increasing the cost of insurance for individual and families receiving 
subsidies under the ACA.  Accordingly, this provision should be upheld 
under Congress' Necessary and Proper power.  See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 
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1957; Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)); Sabri, 
541 U.S. at 604–08. 
2. Removing the Minimum Coverage Provision 
Drastically Reduces the Value of the ACA's Subsidies 
and Imperils the National Insurance Market 
 
 Adverse selection occurs when an individual "wait[s] to purchase 
health insurance until they need[] care," thus enabling them to receive 
benefits from an insurance plan that they have not previously contributed to.  
ACA § 10106(a).  The consequences of adverse selection is an insurance 
"death spiral" which can eventually collapse an insurance market.  See 
Thomas R. McLean, International Law, Telemedicine & Health Insurance: 
China as a Case Study, 32 Am. J. L. and Med. 7, 21 (2006) (“[A]dverse 
selection removes good-risk patients from the market, resulting in the need 
for insurers to raise their premiums; which triggers another round of adverse 
selection.”) 
 Insurers typically defend against adverse selection by screening 
potential customers with disabilities or preexisting conditions, but the ACA 
specifically forbids this practice.  § 2704.  Thus, the ACA requires most 
currently healthy Americans to participate in the insurance market to prevent 
them from strategically avoiding that market until they become ill or injured.  
§ 10106(a) ("[A minimum coverage provision] is essential to creating 
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effective health insurance markets in which improved health insurance 
products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of 
preexisting conditions can be sold.") 
 Because of this adverse selection problem, the Congressional Budget 
Office estimates that premiums will increase drastically absent a minimum 
coverage provision: 
CBO and [the Joint Committee on Taxation] estimate that, 
relative to current law, the elimination of the mandate would 
reduce insurance coverage among healthier people to a greater 
degree than it would reduce coverage among less healthy 
people. As a result, in the absence of a mandate, those who 
enroll would be less healthy, on average, than those enrolled 
with a mandate. This adverse selection would increase 
premiums for new non-group policies (purchased either in the 
exchanges or directly from insurers in the non-group market) 
by an estimated 15 to 20 percent relative to current law. 
Without the mandate, Medicaid enrollees would also have 
higher expected health spending, on average, than those 
enrolled under current law.  
 
Congressional Budget Office, Effects of Eliminating the Individual Mandate 
to Obtain Health Insurance 2 (June 16, 2010) ("Effects of Eliminating") 
(emphasis added); see also Jonathan Gruber, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Health 
Care Reform is a ‘Three-Legged Stool 1 (Aug. 5, 2010) (estimating that the 
average premium for a non-group health insurance plan would increase 27% 
by 2019 if the ACA goes into effect without a minimum coverage 
provision).   
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 If anything, this CBO estimate greatly underestimates the cost of 
excising the minimum coverage provision.  States which required insurers to 
cover individuals with preexisting conditions but did not enact a minimum 
coverage provision experienced far more drastic consequences than the 
premium spikes CBO predicts.  Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire and 
Washington each lost most or all of their individual market insurers after 
those states enacted a preexisting conditions provision without enacting a 
minimum coverage provision, and the cost of some New Jersey health plans 
more than tripled after that state enacted a similar law.  See Vickie Yates 
Brown, et al., Health Care Reform in Kentucky - Setting the Stage for the 
Twenty-First Century?, 27 N. Ky. L. Rev. 319, 330 (2000) (“Health Care 
Reform in Kentucky”); Adele M. Kirk, Riding the Bull: Experience with 
Individual Market Reform in Washington, Kentucky and Massachusetts, 25 
J. of Health Politics, Pol'y and L. 133, 140, 152 (2000) (“Riding the Bull”); 
Maine Bureau of Insurance, White Paper: Maine's Individual Health 
Insurance Market 5, 8, (January 22, 2001) (“Maine’s Individual Health 
Insurance Market”), Alan C. Monheit et al., Community Rating and 
Sustainable Individual Health Insurance Markets in New Jersey, 23 Health 
Affairs 167, 169–70 (2004). 
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 As the experience of these states and the weight of economic evidence 
demonstrates, the minimum coverage provision is necessary to prevent the 
preexisting conditions provision from creating a fatal adverse selection 
spiral—and this is sufficient reason to uphold the minimum coverage 
provision under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  See Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 
at 1956; see also id. at 1968 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(explaining that Congress may exercise its necessary and proper power to 
ensure that another provision of law does “not put in motion a particular 
force . . . that endangers others”). Congress’s Necessary and Proper power is 
at its apex when, as is the case here, there is a certain and empirically-
demonstrated link between a provision of law regulating interstate 
commerce and another provision chosen to ensure that the commercial 
regulation functions effectively. See id. at 1966 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (“When the injury is whether a federal law has sufficient links 
to an enumerated power to be within the scope of federal authority, the 
analysis depends not on the number of links in the congressional-power 
chain but on the strength of the chain.”); Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 Additionally, removing the minimum coverage provision would, in 
the words of Sabri, "fritter[] away" literally hundreds of billions of "taxpayer 
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dollars."  541 U.S. at 605.  The Congressional Budget Office determined that 
eliminating the minimum coverage provision would increase the federal 
deficit by $252 billion between 2014 and 2020, with approximately 60 
percent of this additional debt stemming from increased health care costs.  
Effects of Eliminating at 1.  Yet while the federal government would spend 
hundreds of billions more without a minimum coverage provision, the nation 
would receive far less for its investment, as excising the minimum coverage 
provision "would increase the number of uninsured by about 16 million 
people, resulting in an estimated 39 million uninsured in 2019."  Id. at 2. 
 Because the minimum coverage provision is both necessary to ensure 
that the preexisting conditions provision is effective and essential to prevent 
hundreds of billions of dollars from being "frittered away," it falls 
comfortably within Congress’ Necessary and Proper power. 
C. A Decision Upholding the Minimum Coverage Provision 
Under The Necessary And Proper Clause Would Have A 
Clear Limiting Principle 
 
Appellants argue that, were the Affordable Care Act to be upheld, 
such a holding would “practically end the concept of a limited federal 
government of enumerated powers.” Appellants Br. at 57, requiring courts to 
uphold laws requiring individuals to purchase “automobiles, banking, 
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housing or food.” Id. This claim, however, ignores the unique nature of the 
health insurance market.   
As explained above, the health insurance market faces a unique “cost 
shifting” problem, which causes prices in the health care market to behave in 
a counterintuitive manner. See Cost-Shifting at 2 (explaining that 
uncompensated care provided to the uninsured adds $410 to each individual 
insurance premium and $1,100 to each family premium). The laws of supply 
and demand dictate that a law that increased the number of people 
purchasing cars would also drive up the cost of those cars. Likewise, a law 
adding more consumers to the vegetable market would drive up the cost of 
vegetables. Health insurance, by contrast, becomes more affordable when it 
is more widely purchased. Id. 
Similarly, the national market for vegetables is not in danger of 
collapsing if Congress does not require people to buy broccoli. Nor is there a 
risk that Americans will cease to be able to obtain automobiles absent a law 
requiring the purchase of GM cars. The nation’s individual health insurance 
market, by contrast, is susceptible to complete collapse if people can wait 
until they are ill or injured to buy insurance. See Riding the Bull at 140 & 
152 (describing the catastrophic consequences of enacting a preexisting 
conditions law without a minimum coverage provision in Kentucky and 
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Washington); Maine’s Individual Health Insurance Market at 5 & 8 
(describing same in Maine and New Hampshire).  
More importantly, there is no federal law which depends upon 
mandatory car ownership or mandatory food purchases in order to function 
properly in the same way that the ACA’s preexisting conditions provision 
can only function properly in the presence of a minimum coverage 
provision. Accordingly, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not provide a 
constitutional basis for such hypothetical laws in the same way that it 
supports the minimum coverage provision. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 38 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he power to enact laws enabling 
effective regulation of interstate commerce can only be exercised in 
conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it 
extends only to those measures necessary to make the interstate regulation 
effective.” (emphasis added)). 
CONCLUSION 
 
Amici respectfully submit that the Court should AFFIRM the decision 
of the district court dismissing the case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Should the Court reach the merits, however, amici submits that 
the minimum coverage provision falls squarely within Congress’ authority 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
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